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CLIVE HARFIELD
From Empire to Europe:
Evolving British Policy in Respect of
Cross-Border Crime
The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the metamorphosis
of Britain from a global, imperial power to a full (if sometimes ambiva-
lent) member of the modern regional partnership that is the European
Union (EU). During the same period, transnational criminal activity
was transformed from an arena in which criminal fugitives sought
merely to evade domestic justice through self-imposed exile to an envi-
ronment in which improved travel and communication facilities
enabled criminals to commute between national jurisdictions to com-
mit crime or to participate in global criminal enterprises run along
modern business lines. This development is so serious that it is consid-
ered in some quarters a threat to national security and the very fabric
of society.1
British political attitudes to international law-enforcement coopera-
tion during this period were characterized by diffidence until deliberate
nonengagement eventually gave way to active participation. Progress was
not smooth, and in the absence of a coherent proactive strategy external
forces drove a reactive policy. This is evident in the documented policy
toward practitioner cooperation as well-international policy develop-
ment. Having become more actively engaged in the EU, Britain is now
seeking to drive the EU criminal policy agenda. This article documents
British policy evolution from imperial diffidence to aspiring European
driving force and considers how the post 9/11 U.S. policy of aggressive
external intervention now influences EU crime policy.
The author is grateful for the helpful remarks of the anonymous peer reviewers from which this
article has benefited.
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The Empire and Interpol
On December 24, 1952, the governor of Gibraltar, a British colony,
received a telegram from an organization of which he had never heard,
requesting the arrest of named suspects on suspicion of piracy. The
request identified neither the country nor jurisdiction seeking the arrests.
Three days later the request was withdrawn. The organization was the
International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), known today as
Interpol following its reconstitution in 1956.2
Notwithstanding the rescinding of the request, the governor sought
advice from the Colonial Office in London about the ICPC, its author-
ity to request arrests, and how any future requests should be handled. For
the staff at the Colonial Office, the governor’s letter raised “several ques-
tions of some nicety.”3
These delicate issues are key to any discussion of international police
cooperation. Police functions differ from state to state: Who might prop-
erly seek assistance? For what? How best might assistance be given?
Within any given state, there may be more than one policing function
undertaken by more than one policing agency.4 Policing is a sovereign
issue for a state, couched in domestic political sensitivities that only
become more complicated by intervention on behalf of another state.
These were issues with which Britain had declined to engage officially
when the first International Criminal Police Congress was held in
Monaco in April 1914, a forerunner to the ICPC, which was formed in
1923. Indeed, at that conference there was no police representation in
the British delegation, which comprised instead a magistrate from the
south-coast seaside town of Hove and a barrister and two solicitors from
London.5
For British authorities, forced to consider such issues in order to
respond to the governor’s letter, there was the additional issue of the rela-
tionship between the British colonies and third parties such as Interpol,
and how, in an imperial context, this relationship could best be managed.
At the time, of all the colonies, only Singapore was a member of the
ICPC. The Colonial Office consulted the Foreign Office and the Home
Office. In a briefing to the attorney general, it was explained that “the
United Kingdom is a member of the Commission and the [British] repre-
sentative is Mr R. Howe,” assistant commissioner, Metropolitan Police.6
Howe was in charge of all Metropolitan Police detectives. In the absence
of a national police service, national police functions (such as they were in
1953) and representation abroad fell by default to the Metropolitan Police
Service, which otherwise had geographical responsibility for policing in
182 FROM EMPIRE TO EUROPE
London.7 The Metropolitan Police Service was, and remains, the largest
single police force in Britain, and its proximity to the seat of domestic and
imperial government made it the obvious choice to represent Britain in
relations with the ICPC.8
The response was eventually formulated. Because “the International
Criminal Police Commission is not generally known but some of its activ-
ities may affect the Commissioners of Colonial Police Forces,”9 it was
deemed “desirable to furnish” the colonial police commissioners with
some information as to the constitution and purposes of the ICPC.10
Colonial Office Circular 345/53 announced this to the colonies together
with the decision that Howe was to act as their representative at Interpol
as well as representing British forces.
In 1956 the ICPC was reconstituted with the aim “to ensure and
promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police
authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries
and in the spirit of the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’”11 In its
aspiration to achieve a global network as a foundation for the widest pos-
sible mutual assistance, there was much attraction to Interpol in estab-
lishing Britain, its imperial colonies, and the embryonic Commonwealth
as members. To do so would be to achieve a significant network over a
quarter of the world.12
The British government monitored the reinvention of Interpol
closely, wondering precisely what status might be conferred upon the
colonies as a consequence.13 On April 1, 1957, Interpol wrote to Colonel
Muller,14 the inspector general of Colonial Police, based in London,
advising him that Britain and all its colonies could be members of
Interpol for the cost of just one national subscription, but that for voting
purposes in the General Assembly, Britain would have only one vote to
represent itself and its colonies. On June 20, 1957, in a letter to Mr. R.
Jackson (Howe’s successor), Interpol confirmed that Interpol offices situ-
ated in the colonies would have the status of sub-bureaus of the British
National Central Bureau (NCB)15 and as such would not be expected to
pay regular subscriptions. (Voluntary contributions, Interpol noted,
would nevertheless be very welcome.)
Announcing this offer in Circular 694/58 (June 20, 1958), the
Colonial Office let it be known to the various colonial police commis-
sioners that in principle there was no British government objection to
any of the colonies establishing their own sub-bureau, but it was expected
that the colonial police commissioner would pay voluntarily a full
national subscription to Interpol and would fund his own representation
at Interpol conferences, where it had been agreed he would have no vote.
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Alternatively, at no cost to the colonies, London was prepared to con-
tinue representing them at Interpol. Unanimously, the (relatively impov-
erished) colonial police commissioners voted to retain the status quo of
being represented by London. Likewise, any communication from
Interpol to any of the colonies would have to be via London. The vexa-
tious issue of the relationship between the Empire and third-party inter-
national policing organizations was sidestepped once more: London
remained firmly in control.
No sooner had this matter been laid to rest than the relationship
between Interpol and British provincial forces became an issue. The
Interpol General Assembly met in London in September 1958. In addi-
tion to the formal British delegation, consisting of the assistant commis-
sioner of the Metropolitan Police and the representative from the
inspector general of Colonial Police, six Chief Constables from among
the myriad local police forces in England and Wales were invited as
observers to the conference.16 After such a tantalizing introduction to the
international arena, a number of Chief Constables had had their appetite
whetted.
The matter was vigorously debated among the Home Office, ACPO,
local forces, and the Metropolitan Police Service for five years between
1959 and 1964 (NA HO/287/453). The Home Office did all that it
could to deter the participation of British provincial police forces in the
relationship with Interpol, employing a variety of tactics. A minute sheet
of the voluminous file of correspondence and memos reveals that the file
was temporarily mislaid, leading to delays in decision-making. Two diver-
sionary third-party debates were ignited: the first between English senior
police officers and their Scottish counterparts about whether additional
British representation should in fact come from the Scottish jurisdiction
rather than the English jurisdiction already represented by the
Metropolitan Police; and once that was settled in favor of the English, a
second debate was instigated between HM Treasury and the County
Councils Association about who would bear the costs of additional rep-
resentation. Eventually a non-MPS officer was allowed to attend an
Interpol conference outside Britain. On the June 25, 1964, Colonel
Young, commissioner (chief officer) of the City of London Police,
attended the Interpol General Assembly in Venezuela, at the expense of
the Corporation of London. London was still dominant. This was not, in
fact, the partial success it might at first appear. The Home Affairs
Committee of the House of Commons, in reviewing European police
cooperation in 1990, found that for nearly forty years “Britain’s involve-
ment in Interpol was completely dominated by the Metropolitan Police”
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with the British representative at Interpol always being an assistant com-
missioner from the MPS, and the head of the NCB also always being
drawn from the MPS: arrangements that the Members of Parliament
found to be unsatisfactory.17
The files on the relationship between Britain and Interpol reveal as
much about the internal relationships within British and
imperial/Commonwealth policing as they do about the relationship with
between Britain and its empire and Interpol itself. The provincial forces
never appear to have advanced a substantiated business case for provin-
cial delegates or if they did, it is not recorded in available files. Nor did
the Home Office ever present a convincing argument against such repre-
sentation. Little thought appears to have been given to the nature and
purpose of interaction between British law enforcement and Interpol or
how the imperial colonies and Commonwealth might work with
Interpol. The lack of hard evidence allows the deduction that, in fact,
there was probably little significant demand at this time for transnational
police cooperation either because there was little significant transnational
criminality or because the concept of transnational law enforcement had
yet to take root. Records reveal a government that wanted strict and cen-
tral control over third-party relationships both in Britain and throughout
the Empire and Commonwealth, notwithstanding the prevailing philo-
sophical emphasis in British policing on policing services locally deliv-
ered and locally accountable.18 It was a position that did not serve the
interests of key British provincial forces, as will be seen, but it was a posi-
tion consistent with the diffidence demonstrated toward other contem-
porary initiatives in transnational law-enforcement cooperation.
The Council of Europe’s Regional Initiative
The postwar period in Europe witnessed the birth of the European coop-
erative and integration movements as a concerted effort to ensure that
the horrors of world war were never revisited. This was reflected in the
formation of the Council of Europe in 1949 (through which regional
diplomatic harmony was to be enhanced) and the creation of the
European Economic Community in 1957, which subsequently became
the EU (through which economic integration was to be achieved).19
Following the negotiation of the Council of Europe Extradition Treaty
(1957), to ensure there was no safe haven for criminal fugitives, the next
logical step was to address mutual legal-assistance issues such as assistance
in gathering evidence. This was encapsulated in the Council of Europe
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Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 1959
[ECMA].
Although commentators have noted that Britain took no part on
negotiations concerning the drafting of the Convention,20 such negotia-
tions were monitored in Whitehall. Invited to respond to specific
German proposals, for instance, the Foreign Office at least declared that
it had no objection to them, while the Home Office chose not to com-
ment at all.21
Samuel Knox Cunningham (later Sir), the Ulster Unionist MP for
South Antrim 1955–70, was part of the British delegation to the Council
of Europe between 1956 and 1959.22 It was he who gave the formal
explanation of the British position to the Council of Europe
Consultative Assembly on January 22, 1959:
In the United Kingdom we have three different systems of law. In
England and Wales there is one system; in Scotland there is
another which is fundamentally different. Again, in Northern
Ireland the system is very similar to that of England and Wales, but
differs with regard to land law, and there are also other statutory
differences. On the other hand, there is a marked difference
between all these three systems and the main system of law existing
in Europe across the Channel.
May I give you an example from the draft Convention?
There is a provision for evidence to be taken in one country for
use in another under “letters rogatory.” Such evidence can be
taken in the United Kingdom, but our rules of evidence do not per-
mit the use in criminal matters of evidence taken in another country
under “letters rogatory.” There are other fundamental differences
and I do not believe that it will be possible for the United
Kingdom to ratify this Convention. That is not to say that my
country is not deeply interested in giving assistance in criminal
matters to other countries. The United Kingdom is a member of
Interpol, the organization through which police forces render
mutual assistance in criminal matters, and it plays its part fully in
that work.23
Had the brief given by government officials to Cunningham been
available, it would have enabled comparison with his formal statement,
and between these sources and the brief officials compiled one month
later for a Written Answer to a Parliamentary Question tabled by
Cunningham.24 The brief for the Written Answer is unequivocal:
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The United Kingdom have been against this Convention from the
start. UK experts did not take part in its preparation. We have indi-
cated that we are unlikely to sign it.
The main reason for our opposition is that it would require a
change in our law to permit us to enter into agreements whereby
witnesses in this country could be compelled to give evidence at a
foreign trial. We should be unlikely to be willing to permit foreign
police forces to come and pursue their enquiries here, and espe-
cially to interview witnesses.
On the other hand, our Extradition Acts of 1870 and 1873
and our agreements with Interpol already cover some of the activi-
ties dealt with by this draft Convention.25
Leaving aside the issue that the second paragraph does not
accurately reflect the provisions of Articles 1 and 4, ECMA, concerning
the role of authorities from the requesting state, none of this candor was
reflected in the reply to Cunningham’s invitation by Written Question
to the Foreign Secretary to make a statement. “In the circumstance,”
came the formal answer, “it would be premature to make a statement
now.”26
Why Cunningham felt the need to table such a question and why
the Government was so reluctant to reveal its position in public is not
apparent from the records, but a briefing note for officials attending the
Council of Europe meeting in March 1959 details further the belief that
Britain was already in a position to respond positively to requests for assis-
tance from other states. The issue of whether British authorities might
need foreign assistance seems not to have been a consideration: it is a
matter not mentioned.
We have been against the draft convention from its inception . . .
the purposes of any such convention are to a great extent achieved
as far as the United Kingdom is concerned:
a) by our Extradition Acts of 1870 and 1873 which provide means
whereby evidence may be taken in this country to be used in crim-
inal proceedings pending before foreign tribunals;
b) by the use of Interpol by our police authorities to pass on infor-
mation and histories of criminal antecedents to foreign police
forces.
. . . It is most unlikely that we should agree to permit officers of
foreign police forces to come and pursue their enquiries here, and
especially to interview witnesses.”27
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If Britain had no interest in contributing to the development of
regional cooperative mechanisms to tackle crime more effectively, it was, by
default, actively setting the agenda in defining the most pressing crime prob-
lems facing Europe in the late 1950s. A European Committee of Experts on
Crime Problems [ECCP] had been founded, established at the suggestion of
the Committee of Experts that drafted the European Convention on
Extradition 1957 rather than at the instigation of the Council of Europe
itself. The Council of Europe allowed the ECCP to draw up its own program
of work.28 Sir Lionel Fox, chairman of the Prison Commission in London,
was the British representative and was elected chairman of the ECCP.29 The
program of work decided upon by these experts certainly incorporates Fox’s
professional interests, but to what extent it accurately reflects the most press-
ing contemporary crime problems in Europe is less clear.
The program of work identified by the ECCP (1959) included: pun-
ishment of motoring offenses; prison wages and related questions; civil and
political rights of detained and released persons; mutual assistance in after-
care or postpenitentiary treatment, including repatriation after sentence or
probation; abolition of the death penalty; and juvenile delinquency.
Despite Fox’s concern to avoid both an “ambitious, general and costly
programme” and any duplication of effort with the UN in this area (ibid.),
it was precisely these issues that Foreign Office officials cited as reasons to
treat the ECCP with caution.30 The note also reveals that Home Office
officials were “a little unhappy” about the budget proposals for the ECCP.
The 1959 ECCP program focuses on postconviction issues.31
Nowhere did it consider pretrial mutual assistance and cooperation or
any particular type of criminality. Both the Foreign Office and the Home
Office held the view that, in any case, all these issues were properly the
remit of the UN, not a regional body in Europe.32 In a context in which
Britain had recently declined an invitation to join the “Common
Market,” such an attitude may be interpreted as wanting to limit the
influence of European neighbors rather than as a policy to enhance the
role of the UN.33
Cross-Channel Police Initiatives and Development of 
Cross-Border Cooperation
But such an attitude to the ECMA, coupled with the desire closely to reg-
ulate interaction with Interpol, did not necessarily best serve the interests
of British policing. The first police force to encounter regular problems
was Kent County Constabulary.
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Kent is the historical gateway to the British Isles. It occupies the
southeast corner of mainland Britain and as such has often been the first
landfall for invading armies, missionaries, tourists, and immigrants. Long
before the Channel Tunnel was opened, Kent had major cross-Channel
ferry ports at Dover, Ramsgate, Folkestone, and Sheerness. In the late
1960s, faced with problems arising from illegal immigration, and also
lacking any serious interest or assistance from domestic government, the
then chief constable of Kent, Sir Dawnay Lemon, launched his own ini-
tiative—the Cross-Channel Intelligence Conference [CCIC], the history
of which is comprehensively chronicled by Frank Gallagher, who himself
contributed greatly to its development.34
The CCIC addressed the real need for Kent police to liaise closely
with their European counterparts just across the aquatic border, for
whom illegal immigration was also an issue. In the absence of any formal
government support, Lemon proceeded on the basis of his own authority
as chief constable. The purpose of the CCIC was to exchange informa-
tion and promote mutual understanding. It filled a void when there was
no appetite within government for any national policy or initiatives in
this arena, or to sign and ratify the ECMA.
The latter was a significant disadvantage because even the relative
autonomy of British chief constables is limited when it comes to partici-
pation in international agreements. An individual police agency can
enter into a (unenforceable) Memorandum of Understanding, but no
more. Formal assistance, including the provision of evidence, was
achieved through diplomatic channels by way of a Commission Rogatoire
(Letter Rogatory). At least the improved cross-border contact achieved
through the CCIC enhanced understanding about how the Commission
Rogatoire process could best be utilized.
Kent County Constabulary tailored its own solution to the prob-
lems it faced in international cooperation. There was no constitutional
bar to its doing so, although possible solutions were necessarily con-
strained. When a ferry could cross the Channel in little more than an
hour, a mechanism that required Kent officers to contact the liaison desk
at New Scotland Yard in order to contact Interpol in Lyon so that
Interpol could then contact the authorities in the Nord/Pas-de-Calais or
in Belgium or the Netherlands was a mechanism that failed to address
everyday realities.
Nor was the Kent situation unique. In the Mass-Rhine region (the
region comprising the mutual borders of Belgium, Germany, and the
Netherlands), for instance, similar cross-border issues existed, the practi-
calities of which defied the speed of mutual legal assistance bureaucracy.35
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The CCIC prevails and the police cooperation family has expanded.
To the informal CCIC and the international association that is Interpol
has been added Europol, now established as an institution within the
framework of the EU, which, although it does not itself have an opera-
tional investigative role, serves as a conduit for the exchange of opera-
tional intelligence between law-enforcement agencies and the
development of strategic intelligence profiles to facilitate joint operations
between Member States.36 The Schengen Acquis abolishing border
checks within the EU also contains instrumental provisions for both
planned and spontaneous cross-border police cooperation, including,
inter alia, cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit of escaped felons or
suspects fleeing the scene of the crime.37 While Britain has entered into
the provisions concerning cross-border surveillance, it has derogated
from those provisions relating to hot pursuit (which can be conducted
only by personnel wearing uniform or other visible police insignia, in
marked vehicles across land borders) as has Eire, the only EU Member
State with which Britain shares a land border, not least because of the spe-
cial working relationship already established between the authorities in
Eire and Northern Ireland arising from the terrorist troubles of the 1960s
to the present day.
The Schengen Agreement of 1985 became the Schengen Convention
in 1990.38 Every EU state except Britain and Eire became signatory parties.
Norway and Iceland acceded to the Convention as Third Parties. British
disinclination to join was based on a number of factors. The advantages in
free movement across internal EU land borders presented to other
Member States were not immediately apparent for Britain, whose only EU
land border is with Eire and whose other borders were simultaneously
internal and external within the EU context.39 A second important con-
sideration for Britain focused on Schengen provisions for law enforcement
hot pursuit across national borders. The issue here for Britain was one of
firearms. With the minority exception of specialist response units, airport
police, and diplomatic protection officers, all British police are unarmed.
In continental Europe, like the United States, unarmed officers are the
exception rather than the rule. Britain did not want armed foreign police
officers operating in Britain, where unarmed policing is still the norm,
notwithstanding the terrorist bombings of July 2005.
But there were influential opinions in favor of British participation
in Schengen. In the British Parliament, the House of Lords Select
Committee on the European Union reviewed the practical question of
costs and benefits of Britain’s opt-out of the Schengen system and con-
cluded that in the three main areas of Schengen—border controls, police
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cooperation, and immigration policy—participation was strongly prefer-
able to continuing to opt out.40 On May 20, 1999, Britain formally
requested to participate in certain mechanisms of the Schengen Acquis.41
Britain began participating in the Schengen judicial cooperation provi-
sions in December 2004, fourteen years after the original Agreement had
become a formal Convention.
These developments, and those in connection with enhanced
mutual legal assistance discussed below, notwithstanding, Kent County
Constabulary has continued to develop its own cross-border expertise
and has a permanent European Liaison Unit staffed by bilingual officers
as well as staff dedicated to policing the Channel Tunnel. These are for-
malized responses to police practitioner need. In the absence of formal
structures, the police in Kent developed their own mechanism for coop-
eration in order to address their own organizational objectives. This also
occurred in the Mass-Rhine region, where, rather earlier than for Britain,
the Schengen Agreement and subsequent Convention provided the for-
mal structures that replaced ad hoc cooperation. To this extent it can be
argued that the formalization of police cooperation was a response to
peer and practitioner pressure, a bottom-up driver. But the cross-border
operational cooperation between law-enforcement agencies could not
operate in isolation. It had to be paralleled with developments in judicial
cooperation (mutual legal assistance) to enable evidence to be secured in
one jurisdiction to be adduced at trial in another.
Mutual Legal Assistance in the Commonwealth
If the British government was reluctant to become too involved with
Interpol and the ECMA, it could not avoid being involved with the
British Commonwealth. As former colonies achieved independence, so
there was a need to establish a criminal code that could operate in the
absence of direct British administration. Lawyers from Britain were
deployed to the colonies to assist in the drafting of such laws, one such
lawyer being Frances Bennion, who was posted to Ghana. There, his
work was locally so well regarded that it prompted two suggestions in
1961 from the then Ghanaian prime minister, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. The
first was that Bennion’s time in Ghana should be extended; the second
was that the work undertaken in Ghana could serve as a model to be
rolled out across all former African colonies.42
The British government’s considered response is outlined in a letter
from the Commonwealth Relations Office, London, to Sir Arthur
CLIVE HARFIELD 191
Snelling, then British high commissioner in Ghana: “The original pro-
posal by Dr Nkrumah had obvious drawbacks. It was essentially a scheme
for extending Ghanaian influence in other parts of Africa, and in the
light of recent events, it is decidedly doubtful whether Ghanaian legal
arrangements are to be commended as a model for others to follow.
Nevertheless the letter seemed to contain the germ of a good idea.”43
The germ of a good idea grew into the Commonwealth Technical Legal
Assistance Scheme, intended “to disseminate information on new develop-
ments of special interest in law,” which was to be administered by the British
Institute of International and Comparative Law. Thus the British govern-
ment diverted (and diluted) the original suggestion making it pan-
Commonwealth rather than just pan-African. In his official reply, Prime
Minister Harold MacMillan sought to present the idea to Nkrumah without
causing offense, but in such a way that the latter would be denied any oppor-
tunity to veto the “carefully elaborated proposals.”44 MacMillan’s letter, sent
to Nkrumah on December 30, 1961, and to other Commonwealth Heads
of Government a day later, sought to develop Nkrumah’s original thinking:
“What seems to be required therefore is an all-embracing scheme to which
each Commonwealth country in a position to do so can contribute, and the
benefits of which will be available to all emergent countries.”45
In seeking to influence the development of legal assistance measures
within the Commonwealth, the British government found itself, ironi-
cally, promoting precisely the sort of synchronization and consensus that
the ECMA sought to achieve and that the British authorities had already
decided was not for them. The seeds had been sown.
Twenty years after the Nkrumah project, Commonwealth leaders
met in London to finalize the arrangements for mutual legal assistance
within the Commonwealth (January 27 to February 7, 1986). This was
the culmination of a long gestation that had begun in 1975 at one of the
triennial meetings between Commonwealth law ministers when the
enhancement of mutual legal assistance within the Commonwealth was
discussed. At a similar meeting in 1983, the law ministers formally com-
missioned the Commonwealth Secretariat to draw up proposals for a
mutual legal assistance scheme.46
At the 1986 conference there was a reluctance to enter into a formal
treaty: “Senior officials opened their deliberations with a discussion of a
suggestion that the new arrangements take the form of a multi-lateral
treaty, but concluded that the non-treaty, informal ‘scheme’ approach
(under which countries adopting the scheme enact similar legislation)
still offered the most appropriate approach to mutual judicial assistance
within the Commonwealth.”47
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The conference recommended to law ministers the adoption of two
schemes: the first to enhance mutual assistance in the investigation and
prosecution of criminal matters;48 and the second to permit the transfer
of prisoners convicted abroad to their home state to serve their sentence.
A third scheme concerning the protection of cultural heritage was
referred for further policy guidance from ministers.
In calling for the harmonization of domestic laws and the criminal-
ization of agreed behavior, the Harare Scheme, as the first of these two
recommended schemes came to be known, adopted a formula that was to
be echoed in subsequent UN treaties such as the 1988 Vienna Treaty on
Drugs and the 2000 Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
The Harare Scheme provided an additional impetus for the British
government to review its stance on mutual legal assistance. It represented
an effort to catch up with the ECMA.49 The call for change was becom-
ing irresistible and the impetus provided by the Harare Scheme came
within the context of other cooperative developments.
Police cooperation has already been considered. At the intergovern-
mental level, the 1970s witnessed European nations facing the common
enemy of terrorism, a fact that gave rise to the Trevi initiative and its var-
ious working groups.50 The Schengen Agreement was concluded between
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in 1985
and became a full convention in 1990, to which all EU Member States
have acceded in whole or in part.
Outside the European arena, Britain was entering into other coop-
eration treaties. In transatlantic relations, in 1986, Britain signed a bilat-
eral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty [MLAT] with the United States
concerning the Cayman Islands.51 Two years later, Britain entered into the
UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (1988), which included provisions on international coopera-
tion between authorities.52 The Home Office had accepted that its
reliance on the 1870 Extradition Act (as amended in 1873) as a vehicle for
international judicial and police cooperation was no longer sustainable.
British policy in respect of mutual legal assistance had to be reviewed.
The 1990s: Review and Modernization
Following the considerations of a working group, a 1988 internal discus-
sion paper was circulated within the Home Office and other government
circles.53 Given that the discussion paper is unpublished, it is worth quot-
ing from it more fully than might normally be expected:
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Until very recently the United Kingdom’s policy on formal agree-
ments for mutual assistance in criminal matters was that such
arrangements were in general unlikely to be of significant use to us
because the insistence of our law on oral testimony left little scope
for the admission of witness statements and other documents,
which form the bulk of traffic under the European Convention
[ECMA] . . . this position is no longer tenable . . . significant
steps are being taken to enable documentary evidence to be admit-
ted in English criminal proceedings, and to make it easier to admit
evidence taken overseas. . . .
The United Kingdom is at present seriously hampered in pro-
viding mutual assistance, principally because of the limitations of
existing legislative provisions. These powers do no provide the
breadth of mutual legal assistance which is regularly provided in
Western Europe and elsewhere. The United Kingdom’s failure to
participate in formal mutual legal assistance arrangements has
earned us a poor reputation for cooperation, even in the event of
entirely reasonable and proper requests. It has also caused serious
problems for our own prosecuting authorities as other states may
refuse to render assistance because of lack of reciprocity . . . there
would be considerable benefit to the United Kingdom in subscrib-
ing to broader mutual assistance arrangements of the kind con-
tained in the Commonwealth [Harare] Scheme and the European
Convention.
Following on from this expression of mea culpa came two statutory
initiatives: a new Extradition Act (1989) and the Criminal Justice
(International Cooperation) Act 1990 [CJICA]. The latter sought to
achieve two things in particular. In Part II it gave domestic effect to
British international obligations under the 1988 UN Drugs Treaty. It was
in Part I, however, that the real progress was to be found.
Part I, CJICA established in British statute the principle that mutual
legal assistance will be given in response to a bona fide request from a
proper authority regardless of whether or not a treaty exists between
Britain and the requesting state, regardless of reciprocity and, save in
requests for search and seizure and certain fiscal offenses, regardless of
dual criminality. This gave effect to British obligations under the ECMA,
which Britain ratified finally in 1990, thirty-two years after it was opened
for signature and the British government had dismissed it as being of lit-
tle relevance to Britain. Assistance is provided in service of process, inter-
viewing witnesses, search and seizure, and the transfer of prisoners.
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Bilateral MLATs to which Britain is party, and multilateral conventions,
are supplementary to the basic foundation provided in the CJICA.
The 1990s witnessed increasing recognition on the part of British
authorities that international cooperation was growing in importance.
Within Europe there were two particularly persuasive arguments. The
first was that there was considerable overlap between the Schengen
Acquis and the EU objective of establishing an area of freedom, security,
and justice as described in Article 2, Treaty of the European Union,
1992, to which Britain was a signatory party. The second lay in the
Tampere summit on justice and home affairs (October 15–16, 1999),
issues out of which arose a number of initiatives to which Britain con-
tributed, such as the European Police College and the European Chief
Police Officers Task Force.54
Britain played an active part in the negotiation of both the UN
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) and the
Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime (2001). In 1998 the
National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and the National Crime
Squad (NCS) were created, in part to address the issue of transnational
criminality. Realization that the performance management culture
imposed on British law enforcement had pitted agency against agency
rather than law enforcement against criminals led the British government
to abolish NCIS and NCS on April 1, 2006, merging their remains with
particular elements of the former HM Customs and Excise (HM Revenue
and Customs since 2005), HM Immigration Service and MI5 to form the
Serious Organized Crime Agency, which has 140 staff deployed over-
seas.55 Britain also plays an active part in the Lyon Group of the G8: law-
enforcement specialists advising governments on issues of judicial and
police cooperation and hi-tech crime.56 Although not a treaty-based or
treaty-making body, G8 is a vehicle for influencing consensus and
cooperation.
Mutual Recognition: The Way Forward?
The next stage of progress was to bring Britain in line with other
European nations in the human rights arena as a foundation for further
cooperative conceptual development. Although the first nation to sign
the 1958 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms [ECHR], Britain has been among the last to give domestic
effect to the obligations created therein.57 Having done so, Britain has
now joined other major European nations in asserting the standards by
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which state authorities are measured in the protection of civil liberties.
Human rights provide a crucial foundation for legitimate law enforce-
ment both within individual nations and in the context of increasing
international law-enforcement cooperation because of the shared values
expressed in the ECHR and similar instruments.
Common standards underpin the academic proposition of a
European public prosecutor with particular reference to trying frauds
committed against the EU budget. Fraud against the EU budget has been
of particular and growing concern in recent years.58 Ideas as how best to
tackle this problem have included the controversial concept of the Corpus
Juris, a suggestion proposed by eight academic lawyers in April 1997
intended “to provide a uniform code of criminal offences to deal with
fraud on the Community finances.”59 Although it has attracted much
hostile attention in the British media, the idea remains essentially an aca-
demic suggestion and has not been formally adopted as an EC proposal.
Political reaction is equally mixed toward the notion of a single
European criminal code, a proposal to achieve full harmonization of
domestic laws within the various Member States that is unlikely ever to
find much concerted support. And yet there is recognition that even the
postwar mutual legal assistance mechanisms do not provide the complete
solution to improving effective international law-enforcement coopera-
tion within Europe in the modern era.60 Seeking a way around the hur-
dles, Britain initiated debate around the concept of mutual recognition.
In a speech to a seminar of European justice and home affairs ministers
at Avignon, France, then British home secretary, Jack Straw, argued that
“law enforcement is still using 19th century [mutual legal assistance]
mechanisms to fight 21st century crime.”61 Other obstacles to progress
Straw cited were disparity in criminal laws; the administrative burden of
mutual legal assistance; the difficulty of finding a jurisdiction in which to
mount a prosecution; and the problems arising when the investigation
was founded within one state but the suspect was located in another.
Besides supporting initiatives such as the European Judicial
Network, the Joint Action on Good Practice in Mutual Legal Assistance,
and mutual evaluation as means to improving mutual legal assistance
mechanisms, Straw advocated exploring “new ways in which the different
national systems of criminal law can be made to work compatibly to
achieve the desired results.”62 Mutual recognition of judicial decisions
and orders from other states was proposed as a way of cooperating
between states as if “there were no legal boundaries.”63
Mutual recognition is presented as the politically acceptable alterna-
tive to full harmonization.64 It depends upon the implementation of
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common human rights norms and the consequential development of
trust in another nation’s criminal justice system, a trust that enables the
requested state to accept and execute the court order of the requesting
state without protracted scrutiny or review. Within the EU context, this
radical concept has already found expression in the European Arrest
Warrant (EAW) and the proposed European Evidence Warrant (EEW).65
The EAW, a form of fast-track extradition, is already in force. The EEW
is still being negotiated and neither is uncontroversial.
The EEW applies only to evidence already in existence and will pro-
vide powers of search, production, and seizure of physical objects, docu-
ments, and data but will not apply to the questioning of suspects or the
interviewing of witnesses. The courts in the Requesting State issue an
appropriate domestic order and the authorities in the Requested State
will execute it in a manner consistent with their own domestic jurisdic-
tion. There is no discretion to refuse. This has given rise to concerns that
authorities may use the process to facilitate process laundering as differ-
ent procedural laws provide different protections. Material that might be
protected in a Requested State and so would not be available to investi-
gators in that state could enter the public domain as a result of an EEW
issued by authorities in the Requesting State.
If this concept is proving difficult to implement within the EU, in
which values and norms are largely shared among Member States, such
an idea may be even more difficult to implement with Third Parties (par-
ticularly outside the European milieu) in the absence of a documented
and institutional framework of shared values such as that of the EU.
Beyond Europe? The 9/11 Factor
The increasing interaction between the Western European nations has
extended beyond economic relations into areas of social policy. The new
challenge facing Britain, and its European partners, now lies in relationships
formed with non-European states. Applicant states to the EU need to meet
not only the economic criteria to become members but must also accede to
those initiatives intended to promote the area of freedom and justice.66
The precedent of inviting non-EU or non-European states to accede
to European international instruments as Third Parties is established.
Iceland and Norway have acceded to the Schengen Acquis, for instance.
Numerous non-European states, including the United States, partici-
pated in the drafting of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention,
opened for signature in November 2001.
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The unique socioeconomic and geopolitical context of Western
Europe has driven integration and European cooperation to levels
unprecedented in international relations, but there exists the danger that
relations with Third Party states could be inhibited because they either
cannot or choose not to adopt measures that coincide with those utilized
in Europe. In the face of practitioner practicalities and political peer pres-
sure, British authorities came to recognize that Britain needed to engage
actively in developments in European justice and home affairs (JHA).
Looking from the outside in, from the perspective of the western hemi-
sphere for instance, there may be little attraction in the European devel-
opments. European developments are based on lengthy negotiations
leading eventually to varying degrees of consensus. That is the nature of
European regional relations: no one state is dominant. This consensus
model of international law-enforcement cooperation is very different
from the imperial isolationist model initially adopted by Britain. It is also
different from the mutual legal assistance model adopted by the United
States in which control rather than consensus is the aim.67 The United
States sits at the hub of a bicycle wheel, the spokes of which are repre-
sented by the individual, bilateral MLATs that the United States negoti-
ates to suit its own purposes.68 Such an approach is a consequence of a
strategic perspective that regards transnational organized crime as a
national security issue rather than a regional social policy issue.69 The
United States sought active participation as a Third Party in the negotia-
tion of the Council of Europe Cyber Crime Convention (2001) in order
to influence its drafting in a manner that best suited U.S. interests,70 yet
it has declined the opportunity to accede to the ECMA. To do so would
establish basic mutual legal assistance with many nations with which the
United States currently does not have bilateral MLATs in place. But
equally, to do so would arguably undermine, from the U.S. perspective,
the bilateral MLATs that the United States already has in place with other
European nations. Since these MLATs are ultimately seen as delivering a
mechanism for protecting U.S. national security, there is a danger that
developments in European law-enforcement cooperation may come to be
viewed as threatening toward U.S. national security and the mechanisms
intended to protect that. Here the British lessons seem salutary. Self-inter-
est can be self-defeating.
For Britain and Europe, as the twenty-first-century generation of
mutual legal assistance instruments evolve, there will be lessons to be
learned from the U.S. experience. Issues that characterize the relation-
ships between local, state, and federal authorities in the United States
may well emerge within the European context in the event that Europol
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ever assumes a more operational function and the customs services con-
tinue to police an increasingly complex European economic market while
at the same time attempting to secure the external borders against the
importation of drugs and the trafficking of people from the western
hemisphere and elsewhere.71
With the flying of U.S. planes carrying U.S. passengers into build-
ings located within U.S. territory on September 11, 2001, a new dimen-
sion was introduced into the transatlantic mutual legal assistance debate.
These episodes were crimes of a magnitude, politicians argued, that over-
rode the obvious criminal jurisdiction (in this case U.S. federal or New
York State jurisdictions). Hence a “war” was embarked upon against the
alleged perpetrator and his political movement, leading to the invasion of
two sovereign states.72
It is the response to those events in the years since that has done
much to redefine mutual legal assistance in a process that is continuing
at the time of writing. The EU and the United States have engaged in
post-9/11 discussions on enhanced transatlantic cooperation in the war
against terrorism and organized crime (the two phenomena, it seems, are
now inseparable in mutual legal assistance debates).73 It has emerged that
these discussions in fact were building on similar discussions before
September 2001, which had been kept secret at U.S. insistence. In the
first half of 2002, the then EU presidency, Spain, was authorized to
engage in discussions with a view to establishing an EU/U.S. treaty on
this issue.74 Subsequently, the EU and the United States have agreed to
two mutual-assistance treaties.75
Swiftly drafted legislation has been enacted on both sides of the
Atlantic to promote mutual legal assistance and give effect to treaty obli-
gations. Britain undertook to implement its new obligations under the
EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (signed May
29, 2000) by December 2002 and sought, in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime
and Security Act 2001 (section 111), to devise a method of doing this
without resorting to primary legislation.76 Such an initiative met with
fierce political opposition in the House of Lords, not least because it was
regarded as knee-jerk in character and ill-thought-through.77 In the event
the enabling clause in section 111 ATCS was given a time limit of June
30, 2002, a deadline that was not met and which meant the December
2002 deadline was also not met. British obligations under the 2000
Convention were eventually given effect in the Crime (International
Cooperation) Act 2003, most of which came into force in 2005.
Whatever the variety of urgent policy and legislative responses put in
place since September 2001, whether they are effective or not, the most
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significant change is that the European mutual legal assistance agenda,
and therefore Britain’s mutual legal assistance agenda, now is being influ-
enced strongly not by European priorities (focusing on organized crime
against and within the EU) but by priorities set by the United States
(focusing on the war on terror).78 In the face of both international and
domestic political opposition, Prime Minister Tony Blair has positioned
himself as a staunch ally of President George W. Bush in this regard. In
the name of American national security, it appears to many outside the
United States that mutual legal assistance is being redefined across the
world with the emphasis not so much on aspects of mutual assistance as
on the one-way provision of assistance to the United States and enhanced
extraterritorial jurisdiction for the U.S. authorities. From a U.S. perspec-
tive, such an interpretation may seem surprising, even harsh, yet such a
policy is consistent with historical unilateral U.S. proactive approaches to
international cooperation critically reviewed by U.S. legal experts such as
Bruce Zagaris and advocated by politicians such as John Kerry.79
The United States has demonstrated adroit political maneuvering in
these matters as is illustrated by the post-9/11 changes to extradition
arrangements between the United States and Britain. During research
conducted as part of a Fulbright Fellowship at Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C., May–August 2001, at a time when the first mutual
recognition instrument (the EAW) was being actively considered, not one
U.S. criminal justice professional or administration member I inter-
viewed regarded mutual recognition as a viable proposition in the United
States. Among the interviewees it was universally held that non-U.S. stan-
dards of criminal justice would never be viewed with the trust and confi-
dence necessary to enable mutual recognition to work. Not one of these
professionals could envisage the United States detaining and surrender-
ing for extradition a fugitive simply on the basis of a warrant issued by a
European judge. Yet the thought of being able to secure the extradition
from European Union states of persons wanted by the United States sim-
ply on the basis of a U.S. judicial warrant was greatly appealing.
The U.S. administration took the opportunity presented by the
restructuring of extradition among EU states to renegotiate its extradi-
tion arrangements with individual countries, including Britain. The
Extradition Act of 2003 created a new extradition regime in Britain, giv-
ing effect to the mutual-recognition concept articulated in the EAW and
at the same time conferring upon certain favored non-EU states, the
United States among these, the privilege of fast-track extradition arrange-
ments. Britain signed the bilateral treaty negotiated with the U.S. admin-
istration and established the United States as such a favored state by
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secondary legislation supporting the Extradition Act. The arrangements
in favor of the United States took immediate effect notwithstanding that
the United States had not yet ratified the treaty. At the time of writing, it
is understood that the United States is unlikely to ratify the bilateral
treaty in the foreseeable future because of congressional concerns about
extraditing suspects to Britain pursuant to the new arrangements. The
outcome of this is that the extradition arrangements between the United
States and Britain are asymmetrical: the United States may use the fast-
track system to seek extradition from Britain, whereas Britain has to use
the lengthy and bureaucratic traditional process of having to prove a
prima facie case in order to achieve extradition from the United States.
While this might be perceived as clever maneuvering by some, it also illus-
trates how vulnerable the concept of mutual recognition is to political
self-interest. Comity and cooperation underpin international collabora-
tive efforts against transnational threats. Equally, the absence of such a
foundation undermines such efforts.80
Conclusion
During the last fifty years, Britain has learned the lessons both of isola-
tion and imperial arrogance. Distancing itself from the international
community in the mutual legal assistance arena and trying to follow its
own agenda proved ultimately to be counterproductive to British interests
in that police investigators operating in an increasingly transnational con-
text were impeded by official disengagement. To the extent that they
could, practitioners formulated their own ad hoc arrangements, which,
together with international peer pressure, eventually persuaded the
British government to alter its stance.
Government attitudes toward international police cooperation and
Interpol initially denied the growing reality that policing is a sovereignty
issue in which assistance from overseas is increasingly relevant and
unavoidable. Consequently, the sovereignty characteristic of policing has
changed to the extent that national law-enforcement agencies no longer
can rely exclusively upon themselves to protect their national criminal
jurisdictions. The confident reliance on domestic legislation to the exclu-
sion of international assistance instruments betrayed the perception of
superiority with which British criminal justice professionals viewed their
own legal system, a confidence that proved misplaced when it was found
so wanting by those seeking to undertake cross-border investigations.
Such lessons are not for Britain alone but serve as a warning to any
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nation. It is equally important for the authorities in any given state to
understand how differently their strategies might appear to foreign eyes,
no matter the “obvious” logic from the perspective of the originating
state. Even in the historically cosmopolitan Maas-Rhine region, cultural
differences between neighboring states complicated cooperation.81
The harmonization of domestic laws or an EU-wide criminal code
could be perceived as threats to national sovereignty, so it is through the
cooperative concept of mutual recognition both within and outside the
EU that British administrations now seek to preserve the new policing
sovereignty. Fundamentally different philosophical approaches that I
have identified elsewhere beg questions about whether the extension of
EU approaches to non-EU states can really be successful or whether the
EU will eventually adapt its own policies and strategies and adopt those
of non-EU jurisdictions.82 Whatever other legacies the administration of
President George W. Bush leaves, it has provided a catalyst for change in
transatlantic and European mutual legal assistance, the likely outcome of
which is far from certain.
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